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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which were enacted to address the potentially immense burden involved in
the discovery of electronically-stored information (“ESI”),1 set in motion a
process that is revitalizing the primary purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure adopted nearly seventy years earlier: “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”2
One of the principal means through which the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure achieve this purpose is by allowing for the discovery of “any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”3
The reasoning behind these liberal discovery rules is that once parties
know, ostensibly through discovery, their respective positions in a dispute,
they will reach a resolution more quickly and efficiently.4

1

See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 COMM. REPORT]; Letter from David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., to John G. Roberts, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S. (Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1105/Summary_Proposed_Amendments.pdf
[hereinafter Summary of Proposed Amendments]; see also Damian Vargas, Note,
Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 34
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 396 (2008).
2

FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Although Rule 1 has changed since its enactment in 1938, it has
continuously embraced the same core principles. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory
committee’s note.
3

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

4

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also O'Meara-Sterling v. Mitchell, 299 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir.
1962) (“The spirit and purpose of the Federal Rules is to secure just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of actions and they look to the admission of matters about
which there is no dispute.”); Des Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955) (“The
rules have for their primary purpose the securing of speedy and inexpensive justice in a
uniform and well ordered manner.”).
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[2]
However, unbounded liberal discovery in the modern information
age can carry immense burdens.5 Increasing ubiquitous use of computers
through the later half of the twentieth century, and the consequent
digitization of information, has created an unfathomable volume of
information, and will continue to do so at an exponential rate.6 These
technological advancements allow us to store as much information on a
single server as is contained in every item in the Library of Congress7
(147,093,357 at last count).8
[3]
The creation of more information means there is more available,
and potentially relevant, information to a party’s claim or defense, and
thus more information subject to discovery.9 Moreover, the discovery
norms that developed during the paper era are unsuited to the new
paradigm of e-mail, backup tapes, and server farms.10 As such, a broadly
worded discovery request that would have resulted in the production of
several thousand pages of paper documents in the late-1980s could easily
result in the production of several million pages of ESI today, with a
5

See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1; see also Bernadette Starzee, Law’s DoubleEdged Sword of Technology, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS, Jan. 12, 2011, available at 2011
WLNR 1175529.
6

See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 10-13 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/
article10.pdf; Bennett B. Borden, E-Discovery Alert, The Demise of Linear Review,
CLEARWELL SYSTEMS, 1 (Oct. 2010), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discoveryblog/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/E-Discovery_10-05-2010_Linear-Review_1.pdf; see
also Jason R. Baron & Ralph C. Losey, e-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb.
11,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M&feature=player_
embedded.
7

See Data, Data Everywhere: A Special Report on Managing Information, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 27, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.unitysystems.biz/downloads/
TooMuchInformation_Laserfiche.pdf.
8

About the Library, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/generalinfo.html#2007
_at_a_glance (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
9

See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23; see also Baron & Losey, supra note 6.

10

See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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corresponding increase in the cost of conducting such discovery.11 The
immense volume of potentially relevant evidence has driven the cost of
finding, reviewing, and producing that information to unprecedented
heights, threatening the very purposes of our civil justice system.12
[4]
The volume of information responsive to an “all documents
concerning (anything)” request may be utterly impossible to manage,
forcing litigants to develop more artful and articulate discovery
strategies.13 The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (the “2006 Amendments” or “Amendments”), have provided
the legal framework for developing these new strategies, and an analysis
of court opinions issued since the Amendments reveals that both the bench
and the bar are getting better at doing so.14 Although seemingly modest in
11

See John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564-70 (2010) (discussing how electronic discovery has
increased the costs and volume of material associated with discovery).
12

See John Bace, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew Justice System, A KERSHAW, 13 (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.akershaw.com/Documents/cost_of_ediscovery_threatens_
148170.pdf.
13

See Bradley C. Nahrstadt, A Primer on Electronic Discovery: What You Don't Know
Can Really Hurt You, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Fall 2008, at 17, 26-27 (discussing the difficulty
associated with electronically stored information requests, which can result in the
requestor receiving too little or too much, information); Kenneth R. Berman & David A.
Brown, Practical Issues in Framing and Responding to Discovery Requests for
Electronic Information, in AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., NAT’L
INST., REPRESENTING HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES: BUSINESS LAW, LITIGATION,
TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE 1-2 (1998) (“Broad discovery requests for electronic
information can . . . generate objections and expensive discovery disputes, which might
be avoided by more thoughtful, narrowly tailored requests for electronic information . . . .
[T]he sheer mass of information potentially available, and the cost of reviewing,
organizing, and interpreting such information counsel in favor of specificity in discovery
requests for electronic information.”).
14

See, e.g., Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676, 680, 684-85 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
(noting the Magistrate Judge’s role in developing a discovery protocol and finding she
appropriately narrowed the plaintiff’s electronic discovery requests); see also Pension
Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d
456, 463-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (identifying spoliation and sanction issues stemming from
electronic discovery); Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, Inc., No.
2:05-cv-01059-KJD-GWF, 2007 WL 1726558, *6-11 (D. Nev. June 11, 2007) (limiting
the scope of discovery requests).

4

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

scope, these Amendments set the stage for a paradigmatic shift in the ways
both courts and litigants approach the electronic discovery (“e-discovery”)
process in particular, and the litigation process in general. By requiring
parties to gain an understanding of their own information, engage each
other about ESI early in the litigation process, and involve the courts to
help balance the parties’ rights and burdens with respect to such discovery,
the 2006 Amendments have fostered a more cooperative, just, and
efficient approach to discovery that has begun to revitalize the guiding
principle in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1.15
[5]
This Article examines how the landscape of electronic discovery
has changed in the four years since the adoption of the 2006 Amendments.
It first describes the substance, structure, and purpose of the 2006
Amendments. Next, the Article examines how the 2006 Amendments
have influenced, affected, and changed the way we go about conducting
electronic discovery by fostering greater cooperation between adversaries
and more efficient methods of requesting, searching for, and producing
information. This Article then looks to the technological changes on the
horizon that will require our legal system to further adapt, including the
growing prevalence of social media and the changing nature of privacy in
our information age.
II. THE 2006 ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
[6]
On December 1, 2006, amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 went into effect to address, largely for
the first time, the issue of discovery of ESI.16 The Advisory Committee
began considering the Amendments in the late 1990s as ESI became a
more frequent subject of discovery disputes.17 The Advisory Committee
15

See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The
Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J., 215, 216-18 (2009).
16

Supreme Court of the United States, Order Adopting Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ¶ 3, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see also W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245
F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Mass. 2007).
17

2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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solicited extensive input from “bar organizations, attorneys, computer
specialists, and members of the public” in the early-2000s and, in 2005,
introduced the proposals that eventually became the 2006 Amendments.18
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the United States Supreme Court
provided final approval for the Amendments in April 2006 and, following
no further action from Congress, the changes went into effect.19
[7]
By the time the Advisory Committee first introduced the proposals
that would result in the 2006 Amendments, the legal community was
struggling with the pitfalls and complexities of e-discovery.20 In fact,
nearly five years earlier, a previous iteration of the Advisory Committee
had explicitly recognized the need to address the growing issue of
electronic discovery through amendments to the discovery rules.21 Before
the Amendments, courts were dealing with the complexities and burdens
of e-discovery through the use of local rules and case law, which led to
inconsistencies across jurisdictions and a confusing and debilitating
federal civil judicial system.22 For example, in 2002 the Southern District
18

Id.

19

Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Dick
Cheney,
President,
U.S.
Senate
(Apr.
12,
2006),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; Letter from John G.
Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker,
House of Representatives (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).
20

See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-24; see also Tom Olzak, eDiscovery
Challenges, INFOSECWRITERS (Feb. 2006), http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources
/pdf/eDiscovery_TOlzak.pdf.
21

Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/repcivil.pdf (“The
Committee recognized that it will be faced with the task of devising mechanisms for
providing full disclosure in a context where potential access to information is virtually
unlimited and in which full discovery could involve burdens far beyond anything justified
by the interests of the parties to the litigation.”).
22

2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
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of New York, in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,
adopted a test to determine whether to shift the costs of e-discovery
between the parties,23 only to modify and replace that test less than
eighteen months later in the seminal Zubulake I opinion.24
[8]
Against this backdrop, the Advisory Committee first proposed the
Amendments “to reduce the costs of [electronic] discovery, to increase its
efficiency, to increase uniformity of practice, and to encourage the
judiciary to participate more actively in case management.”25 The
Amendments made the following substantive changes to the discovery
rules:
•

Rule 16(b) was amended to allow the district court to
include in a scheduling order “provisions for disclosure or
discovery of electronically stored information” and “any
agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material after
production;”26

23

Rowe Ent., Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(adopting a multi-factor test to determine cost-shifting in e-discovery).
24

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (identifying
Rowe as “the gold standard for courts resolving electronic discovery disputes” but
modifying the Rowe test by eliminating two factors and adopting a new seven-factor test
to govern cost-shifting for electronic discovery).
25

Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure
(May 27, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm].
26

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (2006); see Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra
note 25, at 26-27, 29. The language, but not the substance, of Rule 16 has since been
amended to read, “provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information;” and “any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or
protection as trial-preparation material after information is produced.” FED. R. CIV. P.
16(b) (emphasis added).
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•

Rule 26(a)(1)(B) – now Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) – was
amended to include ESI in the list of information that
parties must include in their initial disclosures;27

•

Rule 26(b)(2)(B) was amended to allow a party to withhold
discoverable material stored in a manner that is “not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,”
subject to the opposing party’s right to file a motion to
compel the disclosure of such material;28

•

Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was amended to require a party, upon
receiving notice that information produced in discovery is
privileged, to “promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies it has;”29

•

Rule 26(f) was amended to identify three additional items
for parties to discuss when meeting to formulate a
discovery plan: (1) preservation of discoverable
information, (2) issues related to the disclosure or
discovery of ESI, and (3) agreements regarding the
handling of claims that information requested or disclosed
in discovery is privileged or subject to work product
protection;30

•

Rule 33(d) was amended to allow a party to produce ESI in
lieu of a written response to an interrogatory if the burden

27

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (2006); Report of the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 30.
28

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (2006); Report of the Civil
Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 46, 52.
29

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (2006); Report of the Civil
Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 56-58, 61-62.
30

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 31-33, 38-39.
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in deriving the answer to the interrogatory from the ESI
would be substantially the same for both parties;31
•

Rule 34(a) was amended to include ESI within the
information a party can seek in discovery under this rule,
and provides a party the ability to sample or test ESI;32

•

Rule 34(b) was amended to allow a requesting party to
specify the form in which it seeks production of
information requested in discovery;33

•

Rule 37(f) was amended to create a safe-harbor from
sanctions for a party who deletes information as part of a
routine information management system;34

•

Rule 45 was amended to contain language to conform to
the changes made to the rules listed above for discovery
from third parties.35

[9]
Taken together, these changes established a general framework for
parties to use when a case involves the discovery of ESI, and there are
very few cases that do not.36 Fundamentally, the Amendments require a
31

FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d); see FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 68-69.
32

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 70-73, 80-82.
33

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b); see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (2006); Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 71-72, 80-81.
34

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (2006); see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Comm., supra note 25, at 86, 89-90.
35

FED. R. CIV. P. 45; see FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (2006); Report of the Civil Rules Advisory
Comm., supra note 25, at 92-102, 106-09.
36

See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and
Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 11, ¶ 2 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article11.pdf; Todd Mayo, Helpful
Tips for Electronic Document Management in Construction Litigation, CONSTRUCTION
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party to consider and discuss relevant ESI much earlier in a case than
before.37 Prior to the Amendments, parties often did not think about
discovery until after the filing of a complaint, followed by an answer and a
motion to dismiss.38 The Amendments changed the timing of when parties
need to consider ESI by requiring the disclosure of ESI in initial
disclosures under Rule 26.39 These disclosures must occur within 14 days
of a Rule 26(f) conference,40 at which the parties are to discuss a discovery
plan, the scope of preservation, the form of production, protective orders,
and privilege protections.41 In fact, if the parties do not cooperatively
participate in forming a discovery plan, the court may sanction them under
Rule 37(f).42 Furthermore, the Rule 26(f) conference must occur before
the Rule 16(b) scheduling order,43 which generally takes place within 120
UPDATE
(PinnacleOne,
Arnhem,
Neth.),
Aug.
2007,
available
at
http://www.lorman.com/newsletter/article.php?article_id=795&newsletter_id=174&categ
ory_id=3&topic=CN (“Electronic documents have become so prevalent that they are now
recognized as a standard part of the discovery process. This, along with the fact that
parties are increasingly turning their paper documents into electronic form, demonstrates
that the love for paper in litigation is slowly fading. We may never be paperless, but we
will surely find ourselves more frequently in situations where we must decide how to
efficiently manage electronic documents.”).
37

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (requiring parties to discuss ediscovery at their discovery-planning conference and explaining that doing so can help
avoid later difficulties); see also Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s EVolving Duties in Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 532 (2009) (“The belief that lawyers
should, if not must, significantly increase their early efforts in order to properly address
the demands of e-discovery seems nearly universal.”).
38

Cf. Gensler, supra note 37, at 524 (“Despite the centrality of discovery to the Federal
Rules system, the 1938 Rules contained virtually nothing about discovery management,
either by the parties through planning discussions or by the court.”).
39

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (2006).

40

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C).

41

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

42

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).

43

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1).
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days from the filing of the complaint.44
The scheduling order
contemplates the inclusion of a discovery protocol, which, when used to
its full advantage, should include specific agreements by the parties
concerning the scope, format, and timing of the production of ESI.45 For
the scheduling order to include all of these aspects, the parties must
undertake sufficient efforts to understand their own sources of ESI, and
what ESI they need from the opposing party.46
[10] The real genius behind the Amendments is that, when properly
used, the responsibility rests upon the parties to consider the evidence they
need, where it is located, and how to acquire it in a way that is fair and
proportional to the needs of the case.47 A party cannot disclose sources of
ESI until it identifies those sources.48 Therefore, a party must undertake
some analysis of its ESI soon after the initiation of a case.49 A party
cannot meet and confer regarding the proper scope of discovery unless it
has some idea of where relevant information resides and the burden
required to retrieve it.50 The fundamental solution to conducting civil
discovery in a world awash in information is to seek only the information

44

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2).

45

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B).

46

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (noting that it might be beneficial
for parties and counsel to discuss their computer information systems when developing a
discovery plan); see also Gensler, supra note 37, at 532 (discussing the importance of
knowing both your client’s and opponent’s information system before litigation).
47

See Gensler, supra note 37, at 532.

48

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).

49

Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (discussing the importance of
counsel familiarizing itself with computer and other information systems that potentially
store ESI).
50

Cf. Mazza et al., supra note 36, ¶ 139 (explaining that a party who knows the location
of ESI, why the party needs the ESI, and how much it will cost to access, is “in the best
position to persuade a court to shift some or all discovery costs).
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that is necessary for the resolution of the case.51 To do this, litigants must
openly and transparently discuss sources of information, how to address
them, and the associated level of difficulty.52 The Amendments provide
the tools to allow such dialogue to occur.
[11] An examination of e-discovery opinions issued since the
Amendments reveals that the bench and bar are increasingly adept at using
the tools the Amendments provide to craft discovery protocols that are
reasonable, iterative, and proportional to the needs of the case.53 This
newfound proficiency is finally helping achieve the primary goal of civil
litigation: “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”54
III.

HOW THE 2006 AMENDMENTS HAVE CHANGED
THE DISCOVERY PROCESS

[12] From a textual perspective, the 2006 Amendments made relatively
modest changes to the discovery rules aimed at modernizing the process to
accommodate the explosion of ESI.55 From the addition of “electronically
stored information” to Rule 34(a), to the requirement that parties discuss
e-discovery when formulating a discovery plan under Rule 26(f), to the
direction for courts to consider e-discovery when entering a scheduling
51

See Scott E. Randolph & A. Dean Bennett, Using the Mandatory Rule 26(f) Discovery
Conference to Manage ESI Pays Dividends Throughout Litigation, IDAHO EMP. L. BLOG
(Feb. 7, 2011, 10:19 AM), http://www.idahoemploymentlawblog.com/2011/02/using-themandatory-rule-26f-discovery-conference-to-manage-esi-pays-dividends-throughoutlitigation.html.
52

See Gensler, supra note 37, at 532.

53

See Bennett B. Borden et al., Alert: Sanctions Down; Cooperation Up; Preservation,
Privacy and Social Media Remain Challenging, WILLIAMS MULLEN (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.williamsmullen.com/sanctions-down-cooperation-up-preservation-privacyand-social-media-remain-challenging-12-17-2010/.
54

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

55

See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23 (noting the differences between
conventional discovery and ESI discovery and concluding: “These and other difference
are causing problems in discovery that rule amendments can helpfully address.”).
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order under Rule 16(b), the 2006 Amendments largely consisted of
seemingly small changes to the discovery rules that made the e-discovery
process more uniform and certain.56
[13] However, the modesty of the textual changes the Amendments
effected belies the breadth of the impact they have had since adoption,
especially considering how many courts have subsequently enforced the
Amendments.57 At their most fundamental, the Amendments have created
the opportunity, indeed the requirement when properly enforced, for
litigants to consciously consider the evidentiary needs of their case,
understand how those needs can be satisfied by ESI, communicate those
needs to opposing counsel and the court, and negotiate and implement
reasonable and proportional strategies to identify and produce ESI.58
When carefully considered and consciously undertaken, artful e-discovery
strategies can significantly decrease the burden of e-discovery and lead to
the speedy, just, and inexpensive resolution of civil litigation.59
[14] In fact, this is where “information inflation” is a good thing. By
2002, the amount of data maintained on computers reached 5 exabytes (5
billion gigabytes), which is roughly the equivalent of every word spoken
by human kind.60 By 2009, “there were about 988 exabytes of data,” an
amount of data that, if printed, would reach from the sun to Pluto and
back.61
This volume of information is so immense that it is
56

See id., supra note 1, at 26, 28.

57

See, e.g., In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. Mass. 2008); Bd. of
Regents v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492, at *17-18 (D.
Neb. Nov. 5, 2007); Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2009 WL
790203, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2009).
58

See Paul & Baron, supra note 6, ¶ 35.

59

See Kenneth W. Brothers, Six Key Lessons from Living with the E-Discovery
Rules, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. 18979, at 331-34
(March, 2009).
60

Baron & Losey, supra note 6; Borden, supra note 6, at 1.

61

Borden, supra note 6, at 1; Baron & Losey, supra note 6.

13

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

incomprehensible. However, even more astounding than the mere volume
of information is the uses to which we put it. The information age has
fundamentally affected virtually every aspect of our society, and has
ushered in “a new phase of civilization.”62 So, why is this a good thing for
the resolution of litigation?
[15] The typical person goes about her day creating a great deal of
information, a digital contrail, if you will. Much of that information is
electronically created and stored.63 Between e-mail, instant messages,
texts, posts, tweets, blogs, phone call records, voicemail, pictures, GPSinteractive application data, logins, downloads, server logs, records of
security “key card” swipes, ATM cards, credit cards, and automatic toll
booth payment systems, the volume and variety of data the typical person
creates every day is astounding.64 Perhaps more importantly, this digital
contrail is evidence of where a person was at a particular point in time,
what they did there, and very often, why they did it.65 The typical
litigation matter, at its most fundamental, seeks to answer those very
questions: “What happened, and why?” In our modern information age,
the answers to these questions are contained largely, and increasingly,
within ESI.
[16] Simply knowing that the answers to the questions “what happened
and why” may lie somewhere within a vast repository of ESI does not
prove particularly helpful to litigants. Litigants must specifically target
the ESI that is legally significant to the outcome of the matter.66 The 2006
62

Paul & Baron, supra note 6, ¶ 9.

63

See Baron & Losey, supra note 6 (“98% of all information is created electronically.”).

64

See Paul & Baron, supra note 6, ¶ 21.

65

See Apu Kapadia et al., Virtual Walls: Protecting Digital Privacy in Pervasive
Environments, 4480 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 162 (2007), available at:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a651245g33k62p72/fulltext.pdf.
(advocating
employment of “virtual walls” in the computer science field to prevent release of “digital
footprint” information, because third parties may be able to extrapolate unintended data
via “context-aware applications”).
66

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also In re Subpoena to Michael Witzel, 531 F.3d 113,
118 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Rule 26(b)(1) allows discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is
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Amendments have helped litigants focus on these key questions by
establishing a framework through which they can consciously consider
and disclose sources of potentially relevant ESI, and work with opposing
counsel to target reasonably and proportionally those sources to develop
legally significant facts.67 This cooperative approach to discovery is what
the Amendments (and especially the case law interpreting them) are
largely about.68
A. Cooperation
[17] The complexities and costs associated with electronic discovery
require that parties cooperate to prevent the process from devolving into
mutually assured destruction.69 Much of the consternation surrounding
electronic discovery has resulted from the fact that parties adopting bareknuckled approaches to discovery in the age of ESI have driven the cost of
litigation beyond all reasonable bounds.70 Parties who approach electronic
discovery in this fashion often find themselves facing legal discovery bills
that exceed the underlying amount in controversy and come to dominate

relevant to any party's claim or defense.’ A party seeking broader discovery ‘of any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,’ is required to show good
cause to support the request.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
67

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED R. CIV. P. 34(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory
committee’s note; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (describing
“electronically stored information” as a flexible and broad term).
68

See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co, 253 F.R.D. 354, 362 (D. Md. 2008)
(“However central the adversary system is to our way of formal dispute resolution, there
is nothing inherent in it that precludes cooperation between the parties and their attorneys
during the litigation process to achieve orderly and cost effective discovery of the
competing facts on which the system depends.”).
69

See Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for
Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 474
(2010).
70

See id.; see also Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2009 WL
790203, at *21 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2009).
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the litigation.71 However, when parties approach e-discovery in a more
cooperative fashion with regard to issues such as the scope of the duty to
preserve,72 the search protocols the parties will use for ESI,73 and the form
in which the parties will produce ESI,74 can reduce the transaction costs
associated with the mechanics of the process and prevent discovery from
consuming the litigation.75 It is not e-discovery per se that drives
litigation costs, it is e-discovery conducted incompetently.76
[18] The critical structural changes made by the 2006 Amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 have fostered greater cooperation
between litigants involved in e-discovery.77 These changes do not
mandate cooperation where the rules previously required none, but rather
71

See Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C.
2004) (“[D]espite the best efforts of Congress, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
and other similar bodies, litigation expenses continue to rise, often due to ever-increasing
discovery demands and ensuing discovery disputes.”).
72

See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing
the scope of the duty to preserve).
73

See Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL 763668,
at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (advising parties to meet and confer on the use of a search
protocol, including keywords); The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best
Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in EDiscovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 200-01 (2007).
74

See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[C]ourts have emphasized the need for the
parties to confer and reach agreements regarding the form of electronic document
production before seeking to involve the court.”); Sedona Conference Best Practices
Commentary, supra note 73.
75

Cf. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co, 253 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Md. 2008).

76

See id. at 359.

77

See Emery G. Lee III & Kenneth J. Withers, Survey of United States Magistrate Judges
on the Effectiveness of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11
SEDONA CONF. J., 201, 207 (2010) (finding that 70.5% of surveyed magistrate judges
thought the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was “at least somewhat effective in
encouraging [cooperation]”).
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set the stage for cooperation to occur.78 For instance, by designating
electronic discovery as a topic for parties to address when formulating a
discovery plan, Rule 26(f)(3)(C) now requires the parties to begin
discussing e-discovery issues at an early stage of the litigation.79 The rule
does not compel the parties to reach agreement on any issue they discuss,
or even to discuss any particular issue.80 Rather, Rule 26(f)(3)(C) simply
requires the parties to talk to one another about e-discovery before
discovery begins.81
[19] The disputes that had become common were a driving force behind
the Advisory Committee’s desire to have parties pursue this goal.82 For
example, before the 2006 Amendments took effect, parties routinely
78

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.

79

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).

80

See id.

81

See id. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26(f) provides:
The particular issues regarding electronically stored
information that deserve attention during the discovery planning stage
depend on the specifics of the given case. For example, the parties may
specify the topics for such discovery and the time period for which
discovery will be sought. They may identify the various sources of
such information within a party's control that should be searched for
electronically stored information. They may discuss whether the
information is reasonably accessible to the party that has it, including
the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the information. Rule
26(f)(3) explicitly directs the parties to discuss the form or forms in
which electronically stored information might be produced. The parties
may be able to reach agreement on the forms of production, making
discovery more efficient.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (citations omitted).
82

See, e.g., DE Techs., Inc. v. Dell Inc., 238 F.R.D. 561, 565-66 (W.D. Va. 2006); N.
Natural Gas Co. v. Teksystems Global Applications, Outsourcing, L.L.C., No. 8:05 CV
316, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64149, *7-10 (D. Neb. Sept. 6, 2006); In re Priceline.com
Inc., Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 88, 89 (D. Conn. 2005); Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt.
Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. 2005); In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270
JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22467, *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004).
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fought over the form in which to produce ESI, particularly with respect to
the production of metadata.83 As a result, the Advisory Committee
specifically identified the form of production as an issue that parties
should discuss during the meet-and-confer in order to identify disputes
early and “avoid the expense and delay of searches or productions using
inappropriate forms.”84
[20] This new focus on fostering engagement and cooperation between
parties appears throughout the changes to Rule 26.85 For example, Rule
26(b)(2) was designed as a protective measure “to address issues raised by
difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some
electronically stored information.”86 On its face, the rule does not appear
to require any type of cooperative engagement between parties and,
instead, actually empowers a party responding to discovery to withhold
discoverable information by unilaterally designating it as “not reasonably
accessible.”87 This rule would actually appear to encourage mischief by
empowering parties to resist discovery on nothing more than a self-serving
determination that specific information is “not reasonably accessible.”88
83

See DE Techs., 238 F.R.D. at 565-66 (discussing the form in which electronic data
would be produced); N. Natural Gas Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64149, at *7-10
(requiring the plaintiffs to produce the software at issue in a form the defendant could
use); In re Priceline.com, 233 F.R.D. at 89 (discussing the defendants’ objection to the
manner in which electronic information should be produced); Williams, 230 F.R.D. at
649 (discussing the limited guidance provided by Rule 34 with respect to the form in
which electronic documents must be produced); In re Verisign, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22467, at *7-8 (addressing the defendants’ objections to the production of documents in
electronic form).
84

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note.

85

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26.

86

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.

87

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

88

Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524DJS, 2007 WL 496716, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2007) (finding the information subject
to a discovery request “not reasonably accessible” and thereby denying defendants’
motion to compel).
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[21] However, the Advisory Committee balanced this new power of
potential obstruction by imposing upon the responding party the burden of
demonstrating that the information is not reasonably accessible, and
authorizing the court to order production even if the responding party is
able to meet its burden.89 Therefore, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) created more of a
“qualified privilege” than an absolute safe-harbor.90 Furthermore, by
using the threat of a motion to compel to limit the power of the responding
party to resist discovery,91 the Advisory Committee created a scenario
under which parties must engage one another and seek a remedy to the
dispute before seeking judicial resolution.92 This is significant given that
Rule 37(a) requires that a party make a good faith effort to resolve a
discovery dispute before filing a motion to compel.93 Indeed, commentary
on the rule makes clear both that a party resisting discovery under the rule
must provide sufficient facts about the information it is withholding, for
the requesting party to evaluate its claims, and that the parties should
discuss the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the information
before proceeding further.94
[22] Since the 2006 Amendments took effect, the underlying concept of
cooperation has taken firm hold within the judiciary.95 Courts have come
89

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“On motion to compel discovery . . . the party from whom
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because
of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order
discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause . . . .”); see also
Tangent, eDiscovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Instant
Message Archiving, DATACOVE, 3, http://www.datacove.net/docs/frcp_26_dc_im.pdf
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
90

See Jeffrey W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule 26(B)(1) in
Litigation: The New Scope of Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 419 (2001); Tangent, supra
note 89 at 4.
91

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

92

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a) advisory committee’s note.

93

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A); see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (2006).

94

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.

95

See Gensler, supra note 37, at 538-40.
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to view the e-discovery process as “a cooperative undertaking, not part of
the adversarial give and take,”96 and they routinely order parties to
cooperate when conducting discovery of ESI.97 In fact, courts have held
that attorneys now have an affirmative duty to cooperate in discovery and
confer with one another to resolve any disputes that may arise,98 and have
explicitly ordered parties to cooperate on forming a search protocol to
govern electronic discovery.99 Due to this increased emphasis on
cooperation, courts are paying closer attention to parties’ efforts to resolve
e-discovery disputes before seeking judicial relief.100 Courts routinely
decline to rule on discovery disputes where, in the opinion of the
respective court, the parties have not put forth sufficient effort to resolve
their differences prior to seeking resolution from the court.101

96

In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 660 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

97

See Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *10 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 29, 2010) (ordering parties to meet and confer about search terms); see also Ross v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 2:05-cv-0819, 2010 WL 1957802, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May
14, 2010) (ordering parties to meet and confer, and devise search protocol).
98

See Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 571 (D. Md. 2010); Mancia v.
Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357–58 (D. Md. 2008); Bd. of Regents v.
BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492, at *17-18 (D. Neb. Nov.
5, 2007) (holding that the 2006 Amendments “placed--on counsel--the affirmative duties
to work with clients to . . . cooperatively plan discovery with opposing counsel . . . and
confer with opposing counsel to resolve disputes . . . .”).
99

See Dunkin' Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., No. CV 20074027(ENV)(MDG), 2009 WL 1750348, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009).
100

Cf. Gensler, supra note 37, at 566.

101

See, e.g., Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that, under amended Rule
26(f)(3)(C), “at the outset of any litigation, the parties should discuss whether the
production of metadata is appropriate and attempt to resolve the issue without court
intervention”); Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL
1723509, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007) (deferring ruling on a motion to compel
production of metadata until after the parties conducted meet and confer because “[i]t
[was] unclear to th[e] Court whether the parties ha[d] fully exhausted extra-judicial
efforts to resolve th[e] dispute”).
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[23] In large part, parties have responded positively to these
developments.102 Since 2006, cases involving e-discovery have revealed a
variety of different areas in which parties have used cooperative
agreements to avoid many of the burdens and costs associated with ESI.103
Parties now routinely reach agreements on such issues as the form in
which ESI will be produced, which search terms will be used, which
groups of custodians will have their ESI searched, what ESI will be
sampled before broader searches are conducted, and various other aspects
of search protocols.104 In recent years, parties have also begun to
negotiate agreements to define each party’s duty to preserve ESI, thereby
reducing the uncertainty that often surrounds the question of what a party
needs to preserve once litigation arises or is anticipated.105
[24] One striking example of the extent to which this new cooperative
ethos has been adopted is a series of cases in which parties of vastly
different resource levels entered cooperative agreements on e-discovery.106
From a purely adversarial perspective, an imbalance in litigation resources
of this type weighs strongly against cooperation for the party with the
greater resources.107 Indeed, historically, many parties have viewed
resource imbalances of this type as a key strategic weapon to force the
opposition to drop their case or enter into an unfavorable settlement.108
102

See, e.g., Burt Hill, 2010 WL 419433, at *8 (providing an example of defendants
using Rule 37 to compel a plaintiff to provide documents and the plaintiff complying).
103

See, e.g., Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 WL
4884397 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009); Capitol Recs., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418 (D.N.J.
2009); Newman v. Borders, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
104

See, e.g., Widevine Techs., 2009 WL 4884397, at *1.

105

See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
106

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103.

107

See Beisner, supra note 11, at 563 (explaining how one party can force settlement by
driving up its opponent’s discovery costs).
108

See id. at 551.
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However, when the party with the greater resources is a corporation, it
also tends to have more information that is electronic and discoverable,
and thus it potentially faces greater expense in the discovery process. This
has done much to balance the respective resources of the parties in
asymmetric litigation and is one of the factors driving the extent to which
the 2006 Amendments have taken hold.109
[25] But, it would be naïve to suggest that this cooperative approach to
e-discovery is universally accepted or applied.110 In a number of recent
decisions, courts have denied motions to compel because the information
sought was outside of an agreement reached between the parties.111
Moreover, one of the only reasons that courts continue to stress the need
for cooperation is that the parties involved in those lawsuits were
displaying sufficient levels of uncooperative behavior to merit a response
from the court.112
However, since the enactment of the 2006
Amendments, the clear trend has been toward greater levels of cooperation
between parties.113

109

Cf. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“More
important than comparing the relative ability of a party to pay for discovery, the focus
should be on the total cost of production as compared to the resources available to each
party. Thus, discovery that would be too expensive for one defendant to bear would be a
drop in the bucket for another.”).
110

See, e.g., Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 WL
4884397, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009) (denying a motion to compel the production of
documents outside of the date range agreed by the parties even though the documents
might be responsive).
111

See id.; see also In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 5:07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 WL
260954, at *1, 4 (E.D. Ky. Feb 2, 2009) (denying a motion to compel the production of
documents in a format different from the one agreed to by the parties).
112

See generally cases cited supra note 103.

113

Cf. Thomas Y. Allman, Managing E-Discovery After the 2006 and 2008 Amendments:
The Second Wave, in 804 PRACTISING LAW INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, LITIG., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2009: WHAT CORPORATE
AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW 129, 134 (2009) (“Some courts explicitly require
both cooperation and civility.”) (emphasis in original).

22

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

[26] One example of this trend is the 2008 The Sedona Conference
Cooperation Proclamation.114 Building on the cooperative mandate of the
2006 Amendments, the Cooperation Proclamation reflects an effort by
The Sedona Conference to promote “a culture of cooperation in the
discovery process,” and encourage “a national drive to promote open and
forthright information sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training,
and the development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative,
collaborative, transparent discovery.”115 Only three pages in length, the
Cooperation Proclamation sets forth general principles designed to
achieve these goals and guide the manner in which parties approach
discovery.116 The cooperative approach to e-discovery advocated in the
Cooperation Proclamation has enjoyed overwhelming acceptance.117
[27] Since 2008, courts have repeatedly looked to, relied on, and
encouraged parties to act consistently with the Cooperation Proclamation
when addressing e-discovery issues.118 For example, after becoming
exasperated with a series of discovery disputes over issues as petty as
whether a party could file a reply brief, Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer of
the District of Colorado ordered the parties “to work together consistent

114

See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (Supp. 2009).
115

Id. at 331.

116

See generally id at 331-33.

117

Id. at 334-38 (listing all of the judges who support the Cooperation Proclamation).

118

See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (citing Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv01644-REB-CBS, 2010 WL 502721, at *13-14 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (ordering the
parties “to actively engage in cooperative discussions to facilitate a logical discovery
flow.”); Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Trumble, No. 09-cv-00964-WYD-CBS, 2010 WL
1435382, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 9, 2010) (quoting Cooperation Proclamation, supra note
112, at 331) (stating that counsel “‘bear a professional obligation to conduct discovery in
a diligent and candid manner’”); SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (directing “the parties' attention to the recently issued Sedona
Conference Cooperation Proclamation” and its recognition “that courts see the discovery
rules ‘as a mandate for counsel to act cooperatively’”) (citation omitted).
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with . . . the principles underlying The Cooperation Proclamation.”119
Some courts have gone significantly further than simply citing the
Cooperation Proclamation and have substantively relied on it to resolve
discovery disputes.120
[28] Although the Cooperation Proclamation is most closely associated
with the field of e-discovery, its impact has extended beyond such narrow
confines.121 In JSR Micro, Inc. v. QBE Insurance Corp., the court cited
the Cooperation Proclamation when resolving the plaintiff’s motion to
address the defendant’s violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6).122 In response to the plaintiff’s request to depose a corporate
representative under Rule 30(b)(6), the defendant contended that it was
unable to identify an appropriate representative for two of the designated
topics because the language the plaintiff used was “too ambiguous.”123
The court found this assertion unpersuasive and, citing the Cooperation
Proclamation, stated that the defendant “should have met and conferred
with Plaintiff to clarify the meaning” of the language in question, rather
than “unilaterally assum[ing] a narrow interpretation” thereof.124
[29] The 2006 Amendments created the framework through which
parties can discuss openly and cooperatively the evidentiary needs of a
case and how fairly and reasonably to satisfy them.125 Litigants are
increasingly taking advantage of this framework, and when they do not,
119

Cartel Asset Mgmt., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *41.

120

See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 363-64 (D. Md.
2008).
121

See, e.g., JSR Micro, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. C-09-03044 PJH (EDL), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 40185, at *9-11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010).
122

Id. at *10.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

See Allman, supra note 111, at 133 (“The 2006 Amendments were designed . . . to
promote open and forthright sharing of information to expedite case progress, minimize
burden and expense and remove contentiousness as much as possible.”).
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courts often step in to see that they do.126 This cooperative approach to ediscovery is perhaps the single most important impact the 2006
Amendments have had on the discovery process.
B. Proportionality
[30] Closely related to the idea of cooperation, is the idea of
proportionality.127 The 2006 Amendments not only encourage parties to
cooperate so they understand the sources and contents of ESI, but the
Amendments also established an explicit mechanism to confine the
discovery of ESI to that which is most useful to the resolution of the
controversy.128 The Amendments acknowledge that in our modern age we
are deluged with information, but not all information relevant to a case is
necessary for that case’s speedy, just, and inexpensive resolution.129
Instead, the Amendments contemplate that the information subject to
discovery should be the information that is reasonably accessible, taking

126

See, e.g., Degeer v. Gillis, No. 09 C 6974, 2010 WL 5096563, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8,
2010) (ordering a non-party to meet and confer with the defendants to determine search
terms that would lead to responsive documents); Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D.
96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Thus, counsel are generally directed to meet and confer to
work in a cooperative, rather than an adversarial manner, to resolve discovery issues.”);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 48 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“As I
indicated during a conference with counsel . . . if such disputes persist, I will ‘require that
all meet and confers be in person and that they be videotaped.’”); see also Thomas Y.
Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
13, ¶ 1 (2006), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v12i4/article13.pdf (“[The Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] also establish a new paradigm of mandatory early
discussion of contentious issues, including preservation of potentially discoverable
information.”).
127

See Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (“Nevertheless, the Rule 26 proportionality test allows the Court to
‘limit discovery if it determines that the burden of the discovery outweighs its benefit.’”)
(citation omitted).
128

See Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - A
Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, ¶
1 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/ v13i3/article12.pdf.
129

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
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Rule 26 plays a large part in

[31] The text of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is straightforward and authorizes a
party to withhold production of ESI that is “not reasonably accessible,”
subject to the requesting party’s right to compel production of the
withheld data.132 The Advisory Committee adopted factors similar to the
proportionality test identified in Zubulake I to provide guidance to courts
when determining whether to compel production of ESI withheld under
Rule 26(b)(2)(B).133 Specifically, a requesting party can only compel
production of ESI that is “not reasonably accessible” if it can justify the
need for such ESI under the circumstances of the case and the specific
nature of the discovery request.134 However, the most significant aspects
of the Advisory Committee’s commentary on Rule 26(b)(2) are found in
the following directives:
In [some] cases, the parties may need some focused
discovery, which may include sampling of the sources, to
learn more about what burdens and costs are involved in
accessing the information, what the information consists of,
and how valuable it is for the litigation in light of
information that can be obtained by exhausting other
opportunities for discovery.

130

See id.

131

See generally id. (outlining the ways in which parties can work together and with
courts under Rule 26 to ensure that e-discovery is generally limited to materials that are
reasonably accessible and relevant to the litigation).
132

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

133

Compare Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(creating a “New Seven-Factor Test” to be used when considering cost-shifting of
discovery costs between parties), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c) advisory committee’s
note (incorporating the “New Seven-Factor Test” from Zubulake into the 2006
Amendments).
134

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
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The good-cause inquiry and consideration of the
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitations are coupled with the authority
to set conditions for discovery. The conditions may take
the form of limits on the amount, type, or sources of
information required to be accessed and produced.135
[32] These two directives, in conjunction with the text of Rule
26(b)(2)(B), have given parties and courts an explicit legal basis to employ
proportional approaches to electronic discovery.136 Although there is no
single definition that captures the number of possible permutations of such
proportional approaches, the basic goal is to find ways to take an
undifferentiated mass of ESI and determine whether and to what extent it
contains information relevant to the litigation, and/or what retrieval
methods will work best to obtain that information.137 Such approaches
take greater levels of forethought and planning, but have the ability to
reduce dramatically the scope and costs of e-discovery.138
[33] In fact, Rule 26(g)(1) explicitly requires lawyers to undertake this
level of foresight and planning.139 Rule 26(g)(1) requires that a lawyer
sign every discovery request, and by doing so, attest that the request is
“neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering
the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.”140

135

Id.

136

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory
committee’s note.
137

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.

138

See generally id. (discussing the primary purposes of the 2006 Amendment, which
requires parties to plan their discovery carefully and consider costs of discovery before
engaging in e-discovery).
139

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).

140

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).

27

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

[34] Courts increasingly rely on Rule 26 to confine discovery to that
which is proportional to the needs of the case. In some cases, courts have
simply denied a party’s request for e-discovery where the burden clearly
outweighed the potential benefit of the information sought.141 In other
cases, courts have narrowed the scope of e-discovery to that which is
justified by the facts of the case.142 For example, in Calixto v. Watson
Bowman Acme Corp., the court confronted the plaintiff’s motion to
compel the defendant to restore all of its backup tapes to a searchable
format and then search each for relevant ESI.143 The court, however,
found such a request too burdensome for the benefit it would yield and
instead ordered the defendant to restore and search a single backup tape.144
[35] Further, courts have increasingly imposed limits on the scope of
ESI search protocols parties propose.145 For example, in Barrera v.
Boughton, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for production of ESI
from forty custodians over a six-year period and instead ordered
production of ESI from only three custodians over a three-year period.146
Similarly, in Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., the court rejected a requesting
party’s proposal for an ESI search spanning fifty-five custodians over a
three-year period using fifty search terms and instead allowed the
producing party to use the narrower search protocol it proposed.147
141

See, e.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R.
2010) (denying a motion to compel production of three years worth of e-mails on grounds
that "the ESI requested [was] not reasonably accessible because of the undue burden and
cost").
142

See, e.g., Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-CIVZLOCH/ROSENBAUM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111659, at *30-35 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16,
2009).
143

Id. at *31.

144

Id. at *35-36.

145

See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103491, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010); Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676,
684-85 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
146

See Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12.

147

See Edelen, 265 F.R.D. at 684-85.
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[36] Courts are also becoming increasingly facile with the use of
iterative search techniques and sampling to identify the most effective and
proportional search protocol for ESI.148 In Barrera, the court ordered a
phased approach to e-discovery under which the defendant would sample
the ESI from the three custodians over the three-year period and,
depending on the results, the plaintiff would then have the opportunity to
request additional searches.149 Although not ruling under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in Makrakis v. DeMelis, the court allowed a
party seeking ESI from thirteen custodians over a twenty-two year period
to obtain an initial sampling of ESI from backup tapes and determine
whether a broader search was justified.150 Recent improvements in
advanced search technologies, sampling, and computer-assisted review (or
predictive coding) have made this type of phased approach a viable option
for many litigants.151
[37] Following closely on the heels of its Cooperation Proclamation,
The Sedona Conference issued The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery (the “Commentary on
Proportionality”) in October 2010.152
The Commentary on
Proportionality adopted six broad principles to govern the process of
electronic discovery:
1. The burdens and costs of preservation of potentially
relevant information should be weighed against the
potential value and uniqueness of the information when
determining the appropriate scope of preservation.

148

See, e.g., Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12; Makrakis v. DeMelis, No.
09-706-C, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *6-7 (Super. Ct. July 13, 2010).
149

See Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491 at *12.

150

Makrakis, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *7.

151

See, e.g., Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12; Makrakis, 2010 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 223, at *7.
152

The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11
SEDONA CONF. J. 289 (2010) [hereinafter Commentary on Proportionality].
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2. Discovery should generally be obtained from the most
convenient, least burdensome, and least expensive
sources.
3. Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a
party’s action or inaction should be weighed against
that party.
4. Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the
analysis of whether requested discovery is sufficiently
important to warrant the potential burden or expense of
its production.
5. Nonmonetary factors should be considered when
evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery.
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be
considered in the proportionality analysis.153
[38] The Sedona Conference designed the Commentary on
Proportionality to function as a guide for practitioners and courts when
confronting specific electronic discovery issues.154 The Commentary on
Proportionality identified the specific legal rules and doctrines that
provide the basis for proportionality in e-discovery, and provided direct
guidance for best practices under each principle.155 Although The Sedona
Conference published the Commentary on Proportionality less than four
months before the composition of this Article, two courts have already
cited the document favorably when addressing e-discovery issues.156
153

Id. at 291.

154

See id. at 290 (“We hope our efforts will assist lawyers, judges, and others involved in
the legal system work with the concept of proportionality in discovery.”).
155

See generally id.

156

See FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 10-149 (EGS/JMF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115205, at *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2010); see also Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010).

30

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

[39] The twin principles of cooperation and proportionality codified in
the 2006 Amendments and increasingly enforced by the courts are
immensely powerful tools for decreasing the burden of e-discovery in the
information age.157 Moreover, as can be seen through the e-discovery
opinions issued since the 2006 Amendments, these principles are starting
to have an effect on the conduct of civil litigation.158 This effect can be
seen best through an examination of e-discovery sanctions cases.
C. Sanctions
[40] Although drawing a substantial amount of attention in the legal
press, the issue of sanctions did not figure prominently in the 2006
Amendments.159 The only change that the Advisory Committee made in
the area of sanctions was the addition of the so-called “safe harbor”
provision under what was then Rule 37(f).160 Under this new rule, “absent
exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of
electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.”161
[41] The scope and effect of this safe harbor provision is limited.162
The need for the rule grew out of the Advisory Committee’s recognition
that “[m]any steps essential to computer operation may alter or destroy
information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information
157

Indeed, the Advisory Committee expected and intended this trend. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26 advisory committee’s note (“The information explosion of recent decades has greatly
increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for
discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”).
158

See e.g., Tamburo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7; FTC, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115205, at *11.
159

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note.

160

Under the current version of the Code, the safe harbor provision is found under Rule
37(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
161

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note.

162

See id.
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might relate to litigation.”163 However, this safe harbor provision does not
override a party’s duty to preserve evidence once litigation begins or is
reasonably anticipated.164 As a result, Rule 37(f)–now Rule 37(e)–has not
fundamentally changed the availability or scope of sanctions in the ediscovery context.165
[42] Although the 2006 Amendments in general and the safe harbor
provision in particular had little direct effect on the issue of e-discovery
sanctions, the framework for e-discovery the Amendments created, as well
as the experience that both parties and courts have gained with ediscovery, have had a significant impact on the number and types of
sanctions awarded by courts, as well as the circumstances in which
sanctions are awarded.166 The number of e-discovery cases where a party
requested and the court granted sanctions increased each year after 2006,
reaching their peak in 2009.167
[43] However, the relative number of cases where courts awarded
sanctions decreased in 2010 for the first time since the 2006
Amendments.168 Courts issued 280 e-discovery opinions169 in 2010.170 Of
163

Id.

164

See id.

165

See id.

166

See 2009 Year-End Electronic Discovery and Information Law Update, GIBSON DUNN
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2009YearEndElectronic
DiscoveryUpdate.aspx.
167

See id.

168

See Borden et al., supra note 53.

169

Deciding whether an opinion is an “e-discovery opinion” is a subjective
determination. Opinions from criminal cases are not e-discovery opinions because they
are not subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly, opinions involving
general discovery matters, though they incidentally involve the discovery of ESI, are not
e-discovery opinions.
170

Cf. Borden et al., supra note 53 (identifying and discussing trends in the 209 ediscovery opinions published as of December 1, 2010).
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those opinions, 79 involved cases where a party sought sanctions (38%)
and the court awarded sanctions in 49 of those cases (62% of the cases
where a party sought sanctions and 23% of all 2010 e-discovery cases).171
This is a significant decrease from 2009, when a party pursued sanctions
in 42% of e-discovery cases, and the court awarded sanctions in 70% of
those cases (30% of all e-discovery cases).172 There was also a
corresponding relative decline in every type of sanction awarded,
including fees and costs (twenty-nine cases), adverse inferences (seven
cases), terminating sanctions (seven cases), preclusion of evidence (three
cases), and additional discovery ordered (six cases).173
[44] To a large extent, the decline in sanctions can be explained by the
growing sophistication of parties and courts in dealing with e-discovery
issues.174 As previously discussed, the 2006 Amendments provided a
framework for the conduct of e-discovery and guidance on the relevant
issues for parties and courts to address.175 Parties and their attorneys have
also developed much greater familiarity and experience with electronic
discovery.176
[45] Indeed, as reflected by developments such as preservation orders
and the growing reliance on proportional approaches to e-discovery,
parties and courts are actively working to prevent the circumstances that
generate sanctionable conduct.177 As a result, we see fewer cases in which
the court sanctions a party, particularly a sophisticated party, for failing to
171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

See id.

175

See supra notes 67, 125-26 and accompanying text.

176

See supra note 166 and accompanying text.

177

See, e.g., Tamburo 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010)
(citing The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery,
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289, 294 (2010)).
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preserve relevant evidence,178 failing to conduct a proper search of ESI,179
actively destroying ESI during litigation,180 or withholding ESI from
production without justification.181 Although such sanctionable conduct
certainly continues to occur, its prevalence has diminished.
IV. CHALLENGES THAT REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED
A. Preservation Obligations
[46] Violation of the duty to preserve discoverable evidence remains
one of the most difficult problems litigants face and the most fertile area
for sanctions.182 This is caused by two main challenges. The first
challenge concerns the ability of a litigant to know where its information
is located and how to preserve it.183 This is fundamentally an information
governance problem.184 Our ability to create information, coupled with
178

Cf. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

179

Cf. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 AI,
2005 Extra LEXIS 94, at *1, 30 (Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty., Fla. Mar. 23, 2005).
180

Cf. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

181

Cf. Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 113 (D.N.J. 2006).

182

See Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability
of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006) (“While the case law has
developed general guidelines as to when the duty exists and the scope of the duty, these
guidelines are more difficult to follow when electronic information is involved.”); see
also Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010) (“In the 230 cases in which sanctions were
awarded, the most common misconduct was failure to preserve ESI, which was the sole
basis for sanctions in ninety cases.”) (footnote omitted).
183

See Ronald J. Hedges, Discovery of Digital Information, 747 PRACTISING L.
INST./LITIG. 41, 56 (2006) (“Any discovery plan must address issues relating to [digital or
electronic] information, including the search for it and its location, retrieval, form of
production, inspection, preservation, and use at trial.”).
184

See Barry Murphy, What is Information Governance?, EDISCOVERY J. (Mar. 22, 2010,
7:00 AM), http://ediscoveryjournal.com/2010/03/what-is-information-governance/ (“For
those of us in eDiscovery, information governance is about putting in place the right
people, processes, and tools to be able to efficiently respond to requests for
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the ease and inexpensive nature of storing it, has led to vast repositories of
data.185 However, our ability to know what is in that information has not
kept up with our ability to create it.186 This is compounded by the
separation of the legal function of a company, which is responsible for
preserving information, and the IT function, which is responsible for
managing information and implementing the technological processes that
effect its preservation.187 To solve this problem, a company must have a
comprehensive information governance plan so that it knows what
information it creates, where the information is located, and what the
information contains.188 Although beyond the scope of this Article, the
single most important thing a company can do to lower the burden
associated with e-discovery is to implement an effective information
governance plan that includes a litigation response protocol.189 This
protocol should implement steps through which a company recognizes the
triggering of the duty to preserve, evaluates the scope of the duty, and the
proper manner in which to preserve the information.190

information.”). Mr. Murphy’s posting also provides an excellent graphical depiction of
what constitutes information governance. See id.
185

See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, No.
05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (stating
that this is “an era where vast amounts of electronic information is [sic] available”); Crist,
supra note 182, at 9 (stating that “improvements in technology make information storage
easier and cheaper in an electronic form”).
186

Cf. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 259 n.5 (D. Md. 2008)
(referring to “the extra challenges . . . posed by handling voluminous production of ESI”).
187

See Harry Pugh, Information Governance: A Practical Approach for the Dodd-Frank
Era, WALL ST. & TECH. (Feb. 16, 2011), http://wallstreetandtech.com/articles/229216570
(“many companies lack any systematic linkage and transparency between IT and the
people who determine the legal obligations and business value.”).
188

Cf. id. (discussing information governance in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act and
noting the importance of companies “knowing what information they have and where it
is”).
189

See Maureen E. O’Neill et al., New E-Discovery Rules: How Companies Should
Prepare, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 15-16 (2007).
190

See id
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[47] The second challenge is recognizing the circumstances that trigger
the duty to preserve. The general rule is that a duty to preserve is
triggered once litigation becomes reasonably likely.191 For a defendant,
this is usually, but certainly not always, when it is served with a
complaint.192 For a plaintiff, it is at some point prior to filing its
complaint, because it made the decision to undertake litigation before
drafting the complaint.193 However, determining when the duty is
triggered is increasingly tricky, as the 2010 cases reveal.194 The challenge
for companies is to establish clear lines of communication between
business units and the legal department so they can timely recognize
triggering events and readily respond.195
[48] Even with an effective information governance plan and protocols
in place to recognize a triggering event, the preservation burden can be
substantial.196 This is because there is very little guidance in the case law
191

See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 521 (D. Md.
2010) [hereinafter Victor Stanley II]; Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F.
Supp. 2d. 598, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan
v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546, at *14-15
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010).
192

See Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D.
Colo. 2007); Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., L.L.C., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629,
at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006).
193

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (“A plaintiff’s duty is more often triggered
before litigation commences, in large part because plaintiffs control the timing of
litigation.”).
194

See Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 516; Rimkus Consulting, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613;
see also Crist, supra note 182, at 18 (“Courts are not in agreement as to when a party
should be charged with sufficient notice of a claim to trigger the preservation
obligation.”).
195

See Murphy, supra note 184 (“Because eDiscovery initiatives are really part of
information governance, they are closely related to records management, compliance,
privacy, and security programs. The challenge many organizations face is connecting
these programs under one umbrella and correctly assigning ownership–sometimes to
legal, sometimes to IT, and sometimes to compliance.”).
196

Cf. Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 523 (noting that the only “safe” preservation
policy is “one that complies with the most demanding requirements of the toughest court
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and nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to help define the
proper scope of preservation.197
In an insightful article entitled
Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation
Decisions, Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm and his co-authors discussed the
difficulty in dealing with the duty to preserve, which is largely a common
law duty, when litigation is reasonably likely.198 When the filing of a
complaint triggers the duty to preserve, opposing counsel can be engaged
to negotiate the proper scope of preservation, and the court can be
involved as needed.199 In fact, the 2010 e-discovery cases show an
increased use of preservation agreements negotiated by litigants.200 Yet,
when a triggering event occurs before the filing of a complaint, a company
is on its own to determine the proper scope of preservation, and mistakes
in this determination can be costly, even outcome determinative.201
[49] However, courts recognize the difficulty involved in preserving all
potentially relevant evidence and often issue sanctions more on the basis
of the prejudice suffered by the injured party and less on the culpability of

to have spoken on the issue, despite the fact that the highest standard may impose
burdens and expenses that are far greater than what is required in most other
jurisdictions”).
197

See Allman, supra note 111, at 140 (stating that “[t]he Rules ‘do not specifically
address’ preservation obligations” and “case law is not a model of clarity, especially in
regard to its onset or ‘trigger’ of the duty [to preserve]”) (quoting Texas v. City of Frisco,
No. 4:07cv383, 2008 WL 828055, *4 (E.D. Tex. Nev. Mar. 27, 2008)).
198

See generally Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of PreLitigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381 (2008).
199

See id. at 393-99; cf. Crist, supra note 182, at 54-55 (discussing proactive steps a party
can take to ensure the proper preservation of ESI).
200

See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20207 (M.D. La. 2010).
201

See Grimm et al., supra note 198, at 383; see also Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen.
Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (issuing monetary sanctions
and entering a default judgment because the defendant destroyed records).
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the spoliator.202 Reflecting this more pragmatic approach to sanctions, in
recent years courts typically have chosen sanctions more remedial than
punitive in nature.203 For example, one court entered an adverse inference
sanction against a party that destroyed a relevant surveillance tape, even
though the court found no evidence that the party did so intentionally.204
Another court entered a similar sanction against a party that destroyed
evidence because it was not aware of its duty to preserve.205 Although
courts are increasingly focusing on the prejudice caused by sanctionable
conduct, few courts hesitate to award substantial sanctions where a party’s
conduct is indisputably egregious.206 One court entered sanctions of
$100,000 against a defendant that fabricated critical e-mails.207 Another
court dismissed a plaintiff’s case with prejudice for repeated and flagrant
violations of the court’s discovery orders.208
[50] The preservation obligation remains one of the most significant
challenges in e-discovery. In the coming years, courts likely will address
this issue through the development of case law on the preservation
obligation, the use of preservation agreements, and perhaps even further
202

See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (“But even
when conduct is less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the
defendant is extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case.”).
203

See, e.g., Kwon v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 08-00360 JMS/BMK, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13614, at *10 (D. Haw. Feb. 17, 2010) (issuing an adverse inference sanction
even though the party destroying evidence “was on notice of [the] claim” but “took no
steps to preserve the [evidence]”); Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20311, at *19-24 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2010);
204

See Kwon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13614, at *8-10.

205

See Melendres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20311, at *19–20 (holding that bad faith is not
necessary to determine whether sanctions are appropriate).
206

See, e.g., Aliki Foods, LLC v. Otter Valley Foods, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 159, 182 (D.
Conn. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because it had “intentionally and
deliberately” destroyed ESI it had been ordered to produce).
207

See Amerisource Corp. v. RX USA Int’l Inc., No. 02-CV-2514 (JMA), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67108, at *17, *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2010).
208

See Aliki Foods, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
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amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that better define the
obligation and provide protections for good faith efforts to comply.
B. Privacy, Social Media, and the Outdated Stored Communications Act
[51] The decrease in cases where courts awarded sanctions in 2010,
despite the increase in the number of e-discovery cases, reflects
maturation on the part of the bench and the bar in dealing with the
significant challenges of our information age.209 However, there remain
new challenges that courts are just beginning to address. These challenges
relate to information created and used in ways entirely new to the
information age, where there is very little law, and where analogies to the
old ways of using information do not quite fit.
[52] Although privacy issues have long vexed courts, litigants, and
commentators in areas unrelated to e-discovery,210 2010 saw the issuance
of a number of opinions that exemplify the uncertainty and inconsistency
that surrounds the privacy of electronic communications.211 Many of
these cases involved a situation where an employer used its control over
the means by which an employee sent or received electronic
communications to gain access to those communications.212
209

See 2010 Year-End Electronic Discovery and Information Law Update, GIBSON DUNN
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010YearEndEDiscovery-InformationLawUpdate.aspx [hereinafter 2010 Year-End Update] (“In perhaps
the most important development in the sanctions area, the overall frequency of courts
granting sanctions declined substantially compared to 2009 . . . .”).
210

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding a statute that makes it
a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct in violation
of the right to privacy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-95 (1986) (holding a
state sodomy statute did not violate the rights of homosexuals), overruled by Lawrence,
539 U.S. 558; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (holding a statute that
permitted married persons to obtain contraceptives but prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to single persons violated the Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (ruling a law that forbade the use of
contraceptives was an unconstitutional intrusion on the right of marital privacy).
211

See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010);
People v. Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d 305, 311-12 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
212

See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 307; Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
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[53] In People v. Klapper, a New York state court held that an
employee had no inherent right of privacy in a personal e-mail account
accessed through his employer’s computers.213 The employer used
software that recorded all of the keystrokes made on a computer to obtain
the login information for an employee’s personal e-mail account.214 The
employer subsequently used information obtained through that software to
access the employee’s personal e-mail account and obtain copies of her emails.215 The court dismissed the charges against the employer and held
that the employee had no personal right to privacy to personal e-mail
stored on a computer owned by his employer because there was no
unauthorized access.216 In so holding, the court suggested that once an
employee types information into a computer, any expectation of privacy in
such information is lost.217
[54] In contrast with the Klapper decision, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in Stengart v. Living Care Agency, Inc., held that an employee had
a protectable privacy interest in communications sent through a personal
e-mail account using her employer’s computer.218 In Stengart, the
employee used her work computer to access a password-protected webbased e-mail account and send e-mails to an attorney about the conditions
at her workplace.219 After the employee resigned, the employer hired
experts to analyze the computer, and these experts were able to retrieve
some of the e-mails the employee sent to her attorney.220 Even though the
213

See Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 311.

214

Id. at 308.

215

Id.

216

Id. at 311.

217

See id. at 307 (“It is today's reality that a reasonable expectation of internet privacy is
lost, upon your affirmative keystroke.”).
218

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010).

219

Id. at 656.

220

Id.
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employer had a written policy that all communications sent through its
computer systems were subject to review,221 the court held that the
employee had a right to privacy in her personal e-mail account, which
trumped the company’s policy.222
[55] Together, Klapper and Stengart exemplify the uncertainty
surrounding the extent to which the law considers electronic
communications private.223 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme
Court recently passed up an opportunity to provide some much-needed
direction in this area.224 In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court granted cert
to review a decision by the Ninth Circuit that the City of Ontario,
California violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining copies of text
messages a City employee sent and received on a City issued electronic
pager.225 However, the Court avoided the question of whether the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages,226
and instead, held that regardless of the employee’s expectation of privacy,
the City’s conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.227 The
Court stated:
221

Id. at 657.

222

See id. at 663.

223

See People v. Klapper, 902 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (“In this day of wide
dissemination of thoughts and messages through transmissions which are vulnerable to
interception and readable by unintended parties . . . the concept of Internet privacy is a
fallacy upon which no one should rely.”); see also Stengart, 990 A.2d at 654-55 (noting
that, as businesses and private citizens increasingly embrace “the use of computers,
electronic communication devices, the Internet, and e-mail . . . the line separating
business from personal activities can easily blur.”).
224

See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); see also Mark Whitney, Client
Alert: The Impact of Emerging Technologies on Employee Privacy, MORGAN, BROWN &
JOY, LLP, 2 (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.morganbrown.com/docs/privacytechnology%2011-2010.pdf.
225

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625–27.

226

See Whitney, supra note 224, at 3. See generally Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619.

227

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (“Because the search was reasonable, petitioners did not
violate respondents’ Fourth Amendment rights . . . ”).
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The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear. In Katz, the
Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to
conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
a telephone booth. It is not so clear that courts at present
are on so sure a ground. Prudence counsels caution before
the facts in the instant case are used to establish farreaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of
privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using
employer-provided communication devices.
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication
and information transmission are evident not just in the
technology itself but in what society accepts as proper
behavior. . . . At present, it is uncertain how workplace
norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will evolve.228
[56] It is unfortunate that the Court did not take this opportunity to
provide clearer guidance regarding the proper scope of privacy
expectations in personal communications at work.
Without such
guidance, employers will continue to face conflicting law in different
jurisdictions, and will struggle with establishing policies regarding
employee communications.
[57] Another area of developing, and thus conflicting law, regards the
use of social media.229 The need for greater clarity and consistency in this
area is manifest given the rising prominence of social media websites as
hubs of our electronic communications. Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of
Facebook, recently acknowledged that, “350 million users make use of

228

Id. at 2629-30 (citations omitted).

229

See, e.g., Michael Schmidt, A Final Update On The NLRB’s Facebook Firing Case,
SOC. MEDIA EMP. L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.socialmediaemployment
lawblog.com/ (“As the law continues to develop, there is no doubt that the intersection of
social media and employment-related decisions will be crossed again soon in court or an
administrative agency.”).
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Facebook messages, sending 4 billion a day.”230 Additionally, an
estimated 25 billion “tweets” were sent on Twitter in 2010.231 Despite the
vast amount of information these websites handle, there is no clear
consensus on the extent to which an individual’s communications are
protected from disclosure.232 Some courts have allowed discovery of the
content contained on individuals’ social media pages,233 while others have
prohibited such disclosure.234
[58] Further complicating matters is the fact that the primary legal
framework in this area is the Stored Communication Act (“SCA”)
Congress passed in 1986, when the Internet was still in the earliest stages
of infancy.235 Given the state of technology at the time Congress drafted
the SCA, the statute has often proved unfit for the challenges posed by the
technology of today.236 In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the court’s
analysis of whether Facebook and Myspace could resist disclosure of user

230

Brenna Ehrlich, Facebook Messages by the Numbers, MASHABLE (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://mashable.com/2010/11/15/facebook-messages-numbers/.
231

Internet 2010 in Numbers, PINGDOM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal.pingdom.com/
2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/.
232

Compare EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 436 (S.D. Ind.
2010), with Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52263 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010).
233

E.g., Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. at 437 (requiring the plaintiff to produce
content from the individuals’ Facebook pages that was relevant to the lawsuit and limited
to a specific time period).
234

E.g., Barnes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52263, at *2 (holding that the SCA prohibited
the disclosure of a non-party witness’ Facebook information).
235

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12); Mark S. Sidoti et al., How Private Is
Facebook Under the SCA?, L. TECH. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/
lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202472886599&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
236

Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he [SCA]
was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the
existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication.”).
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content based on the SCA is instructive.237 After engaging in an analysis
that commentators have described as “legal acrobatics,”238 the court
concluded that private communications through social media sites were
protected from disclosure under the SCA, but left open the question of
whether other information shared through the sites were subject to similar
protection.239 As the proliferation of the use of social media continues to
grow, its discovery, and any limitations thereto, will increasingly become
an issue for litigants.240
To better prepare for the uncertainties
surrounding the disclosure of content from social networking sites, parties
should formulate and negotiate ESI discovery protocols in a way that
addresses how to manage such information at the outset of litigation.241
V. CONCLUSION
[59] We live in a truly unprecedented era, where information is created
and distributed in ways that would seem miraculous to prior
generations.242 This age of information is bringing drastic changes to all
aspects of our society, and we are only experiencing the very earliest
stages of those changes.243 With greater information flow, people and
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See generally Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
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Sidoti et al., supra note 235.
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See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
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See Evan North, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1285-88 (2010).
241

Borden et al., supra note 53.
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See A Special Report on Managing Information: Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST
(Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.economist.com/node/15557443/print (stating
that digital information is expanding exponentially which “makes it possible to do many
things that previously could not be done”).
243

See id.; Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or
1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 635–66 (2010) (explaining how technology has had
widespread effects on society as a whole, and e-discovery in particular).

44

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 3

businesses interact more frequently and in a greater variety of forms.244
The law, at its most fundamental, organizes and prioritizes these
interactions, and deems certain conduct reasonable and other conduct
unreasonable.245 The law also determines what information is necessary
for the proper resolution of disputes.246
[60] The authors of this Article see this process developing in the area
of e-discovery. The deluge of data threatens to overwhelm our civil
justice system, driving the cost of resolving conflicts through that system
beyond the benefit of doing so.247 The 2006 Amendments were intended
to help reduce this cost by establishing a framework whereby litigants are
required to think about what information they have; what information they
need; openly and transparently discuss those needs with the opposing
party; and agree on reasonable, iterative, and proportional discovery
protocols.248 Courts are using the framework of the Amendments to
reward reasonable conduct and sanction unreasonable conduct, and
litigants are learning how to work within this new framework.249 By
doing so, information sufficient to determine the outcome of a matter is
being discovered and exchanged, while information marginal to that
determination is more often being excluded.250 This can most effectively
244

Cf. Paul & Baron, supra note 6, at ¶ 9 (listing the variety of mediums that have
become available in recent years, and how they have led to increased communication).
245

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (defining reasonableness in terms of accessibility without
“undue burden or cost”).
246

Id. (placing various limits on the scope of discovery).

247

Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (explaining
that the overwhelming amount of data that exists “impose[s] costs on an already
overburdened system and impede[s] the fundamental goal of the ‘just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action’").
248

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.

249

See, e.g., In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 655, 665 (M.D. Fla.
2007) (applying Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and sanctioning
a defendant for “fail[ing] to produce ‘usable’ or ‘reasonably accessible’ documents”).
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See supra Part III.B.
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be accomplished when an entity establishes a comprehensive information
governance program that allows it to know the location and content of its
information. Once this is known, an entity can more quickly and easily
determine what happened and why: the fundamental questions of
litigation.251 This allows parties to lower the cost and expense of civil
litigation and encourages a revitalization of the primary purpose of our
civil justice system: “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.”252

251

See supra, ¶ 15. This is where the explosion of information is actually helpful, not
harmful, to the modern litigation process. The very technology that created the
information age and the consequent challenges it presents in e-discovery is also the key to
its solution. That reality is the next chapter of this story.
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